Are violators of international human rights norms punished with lower levels of foreign aid?
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The Cost of Shame: International Organizations and Foreign Aid in the Punishing of
Human Rights Violators Introduction
How and when does the international community punish violators of international human rights norms? Certainly, deposed rulers and their accomplices must account, at times, for their barbarous conduct in office. This is apparent in the prosecution of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Slobodan Milosovic in the former Yugoslavia, and other alleged war criminals by international or hybrid tribunals. There is little evidence, however, that mechanisms are in place to hold governments accountable routinely and consistently for ongoing violations and to give violators reasons to improve their records. Global international human rights treaties lack teeth and rely upon weak normative pressures for enforcement (see HafnerBurton & Tsutsui, 2005 . Governments do not appear to receive substantial material benefits, such as economic assistance, for adhering to rights norms, or experience costs in lost benefits for violating them. Research suggests that the strategic relationship between a donor and recipient and, to a lesser extent, the economic needs of the recipient account for the flow of aid and that human rights abuses are a modest, negative predictor of bilateral allocations for only some donor countries (Alesina & Dollar, 2000; Alesina & Weder, 2002; Lebovic, 1988 Lebovic, , 2005 Neumayer, 2003a ).
2
Existing findings pertain only to a direct relationship between assistance and rights practices. Yet, states might punish human rights violators indirectly by passing the task to international organizations (IOs) that are not under pressure to preserve strategic relationships with rights abusers. This is a possible result if: a) multilateral aid institutions want to consider these abuses, and b) multilateral aid institutions can bypass restrictions on evaluating the political character of potential recipients. We speculate that both conditions apply. Specifically, we argue that a multilateral aid institution might selectively reduce aid when receiving signals from the international community that certain human rights violators are politically acceptable targets. Such signals are provided by public votes in IOs, in this case the United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR). 'Shaming' in the UNCHR through resolutions that explicitly criticized a government for its human rights record provided substantive information about rights abuses and gave political cover for liberal multilateral aid institutions seeking to sanction human rights violators. The result was a reduction in multilateral --but not bilateral -aid received by targets of public UNCHR resolutions.
Admittedly, we invite controversy by arguing that multilateral aid-granting institutions that promote the policy preferences of Western industrial states take guidance from an institution, like the UNCHR, that was notorious for its biased handling of rights abuses throughout the Cold War and post-Cold War periods. The UNCHR was formally disbanded in 2006 after a decades-long history that provoked charges that members were more interested in protecting themselves and their allies and hurting enemies than in punishing rights abuses. Our response is two-fold. First, we concede that politics influenced commission behavior; in fact, our argument requires a widely held perception that UNCHR resolutions were politically motivated (i.e. that some abusers avoided punishment, and other states received relatively severe sanctions, at least partially for political reasons). We also assume, however, that some states --Burma, South Africa under a white minority government, Cambodia under Pol Pot, and Iraq under Saddam Hussein, to name but a few --became political outcasts within the international community in no small measure because these states were abusive. The targeting by the commission of these states signaled effectively that they were 'safe targets' for material and nonmaterial sanctions by other institutions, dispatched at their discretion. An earlier study substantiates the assumptions that UNCHR resolutions are motivated by both political factors and actual human rights violations. Second, we do not assume that donor institutions methodically monitored the actions of the UNCHR or that its resolutions were important in a formal or legalistic sense. We assume only that these resolutions articulate global political realities that are gleaned, as well, from other (perhaps less formal) international sources. We remain open to the possibility, however, that these resolutions damaged the reputations of the targeted countries and increased their susceptibility to punishment.
In this article, we focus on two IOs -the UNCHR, the UN's main body for sanctioning countries for their human rights abuses, until it was replaced by the Human Rights Council 4 in 2006, and the World Bank Group (in particular, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, or IBRD, and the International Development Association, IDA). In principle, our theory applies to all international financial institutions that might take domestic human rights violations into account but are politically constrained from doing so. We focus on the World Bank because it is the largest global multilateral aid institution devoted to development aid, a liberal institution (given weighted voting that favors Western, industrialized countries), and attentive to human rights and legal institutions within participating countries, compared to other global international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund. Indeed, the World Bank is under increasing pressure to consider the political character of recipient governments despite explicit prohibitions from doing so in the Bank's Articles of Agreement (founding document).
We organize this article as follows. First, we present the theory behind our arguments and the plausible roles of the World Bank and the UNCHR in punishing rights abuses.
Second, we present descriptive evidence for our main hypotheses using cross-sectional timeseries data on aggregate bilateral, multilateral, and World Bank aid commitments from 1979 to 2002. During this period, the UNCHR became increasingly active and employed diverse mechanisms to sanction a wide variety of countries. Third, we subject our hypotheses to rigorous tests with multiple regression analysis. Fourth, we conduct robustness tests of our results, including a replication of an earlier study (Neumayer, 2003b) . We conclude that the support for our propositions is considerable and robust with respect to alternative model specifications and estimating techniques. The evidence supports prior findings that 'objective' measures of human rights have no robust effect on aid allocation and shows further that UNCHR resolutions have no impact on aggregate bilateral aid. The evidence establishes, however, that these resolutions have a substantial effect on multilateral aid and World Bank aid.
Human Rights Norms, Aid Giving, and IOs
Evidence abounds that governments internalize human rights norms by incorporating them into their own domestic rights practices (e.g. Risse & Sikkink, 1999 ). Yet, the social stigma of violating human rights norms is obviously insufficient to prevent widespread rights abuses, and many governments sign and ratify human rights treaties and then routinely violate them (e.g. Hathaway, 2002) . Therefore, it is helpful to study the mechanisms that states employ to reward compliance and sanction non-compliance with given rights standards, as well as the obstacles that impede the effective use of these mechanisms.
One plausible mechanism, in this regard, is bilateral aid. Scholars have long studied the extent to which donor countries condition their aid allocations on the human rights and democratic practices of potential recipients. Most empirical studies on the subject focus on U.S. foreign aid (e.g. Abrams & Lewis, 1993; Apodaca & Stohl, 1999; Carleton & Stohl, 1987; Cingranelli & Pasquarello, 1985; Meernik, Krueger & Poe, 1998; Poe, 1992) , with mixed results. In general, they reveal that aid is more sensitive to a country's political and civil liberties than personal integrity rights, and that economic aid, more than military aid, 6 is influenced by rights considerations. The significance of these effects is not robust, though, to method, period, and location. Studies on a broad range of donors also indicate that despite their self-proclaimed commitment to human rights, aid allocations are largely based on the political objectives of donors and, less so, on the economic needs of recipients and/or their rights practices (e.g. Alesina and Dollar, 2000; Carey, 2007; Lebovic, 1988 Lebovic, , 2005 Neumayer, 2003c, d; Schraeder, Hook & Taylor, 1998 (Lebovic, 2005) . Thus, donor governments might hide behind the policies and procedures of (somewhat nontransparent) international institutions by allowing them to perform a 'laundering' function (e.g. Abbott & Snidal, 1998 had withheld more than $1 billion in aid to countries on suspicions of corruption (Torchia, 2006) . As one board member retorted, 'the bank should not become a world policeman pointing its moral finger and conditioning everything on whether or not a country is believed to be corrupt. The more the bank goes beyond its old mandate of reducing poverty, the more problems will come up' (quoted in Weisman, 2006) . This obviously uncompromising response is rooted in realistic fears that an anti-corruption campaign will lead to growing Bank intrusions into politics within aid-recipient countries. Indeed, Wolfowitz (2006) 2 The reality is that political criteria are politically sensitive, by definition, and preferably introduced into funding decisions with caution to avoid opening the Bank to charges of bias. Participants must feel comfortable that the targeted countries are worthy of punishment and that the use of political criteria will not set precedents that politicize -and maybe paralyze --the institution.
In practice, political considerations -and human rights, in particular --had come to shape the World Bank's aid granting criteria well before Wolfowitz' appointment (see Bradlow, 1996; Saiegh, 2005; Skogly, 2001) , for the following reasons. 3 First, the Bank staff, which has considerable power in recommending projects, has acted within the leeway allowed by an absence of clear guidelines on what constitutes the 'economic' and the 'political'. Second, the World Bank has assessed how its programs and policies affect societies, cultures, minorities, and genders, with an expansion in the number of global treaties that govern the rights of these groups and concerted efforts by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to push their agendas upon intergovernmental institutions. The refocusing has been institutionalized through the installation of specific Bank divisions that address these matters. Third, the World Bank's economists have recognized that the economic aspects of policies, programs, and projects cannot be considered apart from their political dimensions. 4 For example, in 1998 the World Bank published an influential Policy
Research Report, which argued that aid has only been effective in countries with 'good governance' (World Bank, 1998) . Consequentially, the Bank has increased its efforts to measure good governance and now publishes rankings of its aid recipients on various aspects of good governance, 5 including human rights (see Kaufmann, 2005) .
Whereas the Bank focused traditionally on infrastructure, it now devotes more than half of its lending to human development and legal and institutional reforms. The expected return depends critically upon the domestic political and social character of a country.
Important, too, is that the Bank has increased its collaboration with the UN High
Commissioner for Human Rights, 6 which led to the formation of a Work Group on Human
Rights headed by general counsel Roberto Dañino. He argued that changing legal understandings of the protections of sovereignty and changing beliefs about the relation between human rights and economic development require a broader interpretation of the limits imposed by the Bank's Articles of Agreement (Dañino, 2004). 7 Although the World Bank has allegedly denied aid to countries like Kenya and Malawi specifically because of their rights practices (though justifying the decision in economic terms; see Bradlow, 1996: 79) , the Bank must be sensitive to political constraints. We suggest that UNCHR resolutions that publicly chastised countries for their human rights abuses provided relevant signals to the Bank staff. These resolutions conveyed information about human rights violations and the political opposition to the abusers within the international community. Thus, we suggest that UNCHR resolutions were informative --not despite -but, at least partially, because of the politics involved in commission decisions. 8 The UNCHR served for over half a century as the principal UN organ for promoting global respect for human rights, with a mandate to scrutinize rights practices and enforce an ever-growing number of rights treaties. (For a detailed look at the UNCHR and its performance, see .) Each spring, more than 3,000 delegates from governments and NGOs congregated in Geneva to attend the commission's six-week regular session. With the diverse membership of the commission, its deliberations and sanctioning votes were often controversial, and certainly political. Given profound differences in outlook and interests among its members, the commission focused on principle throughout much of its early history and confined its specific efforts to symbolic cases --notably, Israel, South Africa, and Chile. This led Donnelly (1988) to conclude that the commission was biased against pro-U.S. and in favor of left-leaning regimes. By the 1980s, the commission had acquired several devices, of varying severity, for expressing displeasure with a country's rights practices and, by the end of the Cold War, the commission was liberally employing all of these instruments. The UNCHR held hearings, appointed investigators, and with its most powerful tool, passed public resolutions that officially, loudly, and unequivocally condemned a large variety of countries for their purported abuses. During our period of analysis, the UNCHR examined the human rights records of 92 countries at least once, reprimanded 62 countries at least once, and adopted public resolutions criticizing the human rights records of 34 different countries, many on multiple occasions.
Through these resolutions, the commission continued to engage in selective sanctioning votes that included the frequent targeting of Israel to the neglect of major rights abusers such as China. Indeed, concerns about questionable voting and the human rights records of some of the UNCHR's members led the UN Secretary General to call for disbanding the commission, resulting in negotiations for a replacement body, which culminated in the creation of the Human Rights Council in June 2006. Nevertheless, politics was not the only source of commission behavior even in the Cold War years. In a large statistical analysis, conclude that politics mattered in targeting and punishment by the UNCHR but so did increasingly a variety of other factors that do not fit comfortably with a realist account. These factors include whether potential targets have committed formally to major rights treaties, the rights practices of these countries, and their participation within the international community (i.e. various IOs).
Thus, multilateral aid organizations might have looked to the UNCHR to identify rights abusers that were punishable with impunity. We assume that the World Bank was peculiarly attentive to the international standing of a country with respect to its human rights practices given the Bank's well-documented liberal bias, attention to the domestic practices of recipient governments, and desire to avoid contentious decisions. 9 At the same time, we 12 do not believe that the World Bank or other multilateral institutions distributed aid in response to the more impartial rights assessments of NGOs, such as Amnesty International.
If our arguments hold, such judgments affected aid receipts indirectly by helping shape a political consensus that certain violators deserve punishment. We thus test the following hypotheses:
H1: Countries publicly sanctioned by the UNCHR experience reduced multilateral aid allocations, especially World Bank loans.
H2: Countries publicly sanctioned by the UNCHR do not experience reduced bilateral aid allocations.
H3: Assessments of human rights violations have no direct effect on multilateral aid allocations.
Theoretically, this argument fits most comfortably within the liberal institutionalist framework (Keohane & Martin, 1995) . It suggests that IOs help governments address two dilemmas -the first, a coordinative dilemma and, the second, a collaborative one. With respect to coordination, political institutions render judgments that serve as a focal point, that is, widely accepted opinions that a transgression should be punished (Weingast, 1997; Voeten, 2005) . With respect to collaboration, IOs (multilateral aid institutions) help governments cooperate when they have strong incentives to defect.
Shaming and Aid: Preliminary Patterns
The OECD's International Development Statistics is the source for our aid data. The sample includes all countries identified as 'developing countries' by the OECD in the 1979-2002 period. 12 As is common in studies of aid allocation, we exclude Egypt and
Israel from the analysis to acknowledge the unique aid trajectory and amounts for these countries. This leaves us with 118 developing countries. Our main independent variable is the adoption of a public UNCHR resolution. We expect that a UNCHR resolution in year t- were not condemned by a public UNCHR resolution in the preceding year. The graphs show that, on average, developing countries subject to a UNCHR resolution received less than half the World Bank commitments of countries that were not accorded this treatment.
Similarly, total multilateral ODA commitments were almost half those for countries subjected to UNCHR shaming. There was no notable difference, however, in the bilateral 14 aid commitments received by countries that were, and were not, singled out by the UNCHR.
This evidence is only suggestive and does not control for several confounding factors.
For that reason, we turn to the estimation of multiple regression models.
Multiple Regression Analysis
In this section, we present the control variables for our multiple regression analysis, the statistical model that we estimate, and the resulting model estimates. 
Control Variables
The effects of UNCHR resolutions on aid could easily be conflated with the effects of the human rights performance for a given country and year, as judged by a more impartial source. Because human rights performance can affect both the probability of a UNCHR resolution and aid levels, our models include the widely used 'Political-Terror-Scale' (PTS) based on Amnesty International reports. 13 Countries are ranked for their physical integrity rights on a five-point scale, where countries with low values exhibit little or no political terror and countries with high values experience regular terror and abuse. We also include
Freedom House civil liberty scores in our model. 14 Freedom House yearly assigns scores to countries on a seven-point scale, where low scores (1) indicate the most free countries and high scores (7) the least free countries. These two indicators measure quite distinct aspects of a country's human rights record, both theoretically and empirically, as indicated by the relatively modest .21 bivariate correlation between these variables for our sample. As Table   I shows, countries subject to UNCHR resolutions had somewhat worse human rights records than countries that were not subject to such resolutions in a given year.
Because the literature suggests that aid levels are need-based and because poorer countries might be inviting targets for UNCHR resolutions, we control for a potential spurious relationship by incorporating into the model a measure of economic need -natural log of GDP per capita in 2004 dollars, drawn from International Development Statistics. A similar logic informs our decision to include population in our model. Given a potential bias against countries with large populations in per capita aid distribution (e.g., India receives large amounts of aid but not in proportion to its large population) and a plausible bias (for or against) large countries in the UN sanctioning process, we include the natural log of total population in the model.
As is common in the literature, we include a measure of vote correspondence with the US in the UN General Assembly (e.g. Alesina & Dollar, 2000 , Andersen, Hansen, & Markussen, 2006 . 15 This variable measures how much a country's foreign policy orientation coincides with that of the United States and, indirectly, Western countries more generally (see Voeten, 2000) . This variable is a useful control because Western countries, as influential participants in the World Bank and other large multilateral aid organizations, might promote their alignments with multilateral aid and because UN voting is a known correlate of UNCHR sanctioning behavior ).
In addition, we include two control variables measuring the strategic standing of potential recipients. First, involvement in armed conflict may make a country more susceptible to UNCHR condemnation (as shown in Table I ) and may also reduce the country's supply of aid, at least from multilateral sources. Multilateral institutions generally distribute aid for specific projects which are less likely to succeed in countries that are actively involved in armed conflict either internally or externally (as resources are diverted toward the military, economic disruptions occur, infrastructures suffer, and populations are dislocated). We therefore include a dummy variable that takes the value one if a state is involved in an armed conflict, as identified by Gleditsch et al. (2002) . 16 Second, we include a measure of a country's material capabilities -based on the Correlates of War's Composite
Indicator of National Capability (CINC). 17 This is a composite indicator of military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production, urban population, and total population. If aid is determined by strategic concerns, we would expect that stronger countries receive more aid; moreover, if UNCHR shaming is political, we expect that, compared to weaker states, powerful states are more likely to escape UNCHR resolutions (see .
Finally, we include orthogonal quadratic temporal trends. This controls for across the board fluctuations in levels of aid giving. 18 
Methods
In our main specification, the dependent variable is the natural log of aid per capita, as is common in the literature (e.g. Alesina & Weder, 2002 ). 19 The model includes a lagged dependent variable to account for the general stability in aid receipts. All covariates are entered with one-year lags. Human rights violations are also included as first differences to account for short-term changes in human rights observance that might have an immediate effect on aid (see Neumayer, 2003d) . 20 An important decision in any analysis of time-series cross-section data concerns the amount of pooling to assume across units (countries). Traditionally, the choice has been to either assume full-pooling (all countries are homogenous) or no pooling (a specific intercept for each country or 'fixed effects'). We estimate fixed effects models but follow recent developments in the literature by also estimating a random effects model that allows for unit (country) heterogeneity but is not as restrictive as the fixed-effects model. 21 This model can be estimated through full MLE and offers considerable advantages over alternative pooling assumptions (see Beck & Katz, 2007) . 22 We include the measures for human rights abuses both as levels and changes, acknowledging the possibility that short-term positive (negative) shifts in levels of human rights abuses may lead to rewards (punishments). With covariates X, treatment variable T (in deference to the special 'treatment' accorded some countries via a UNCHR resolution), 23 and country-specific normally distributed random effects Z, the main regression equation is: (Thacker, 1999) and fits our assumption that Bretton
Woods institutions are beholden to liberal states.
Robustness Checks and a Replication
We performed several robustness checks on our results using different combinations of variables and different functional specifications of the models. All results from the robustness checks are available from the authors' website.
A first concern is that the random and fixed effects do not sufficiently capture the difference between states that are subjected to UNCHR resolutions. We therefore estimated the model on only those countries that were subject to a UNCHR resolution at some point during our period of analysis. An analysis on this sub-sample should reveal whether countries that experience UNCHR sanctions are rewarded/punished when those sanctions are lifted/imposed. The coefficient on the UNCHR resolution is still statistically and substantively significant for overall multilateral aid (-.23, p=.004, in the random effects specification and -.22, p=.019, in the fixed effects specification). 25 The coefficient just fails to reach conventional levels of statistical significance for World Bank aid (-.22, p=.118, in a two-tailed significance test). We should note, however, that the World Bank sample now includes only 21 countries and the only variable that reaches the conventional .05 significance level is the war dummy.
An alternative way of addressing this issue is to include a dummy variable in the model that takes the value 1 in the year immediately preceding a UNCHR resolution (if there was no resolution in that year). If our result arises not because of the actual implications of public shaming but rather because of unmodeled country-characteristics, we would expect this variable to have a similar effect to the UNCHR resolution variable (after all, the objective characteristics of countries rarely change much in a year). When incorporated into the model, the coefficient is indistinguishable from zero in all specifications (and positively signed in some specifications). Moreover, the coefficient on the UNCHR resolution remains negative and significantly different from zero (and from the coefficient on the dummy).
Second, we reran the models for bilateral and multilateral aid on the sample of countries that received World Bank loans because countries receiving World Bank aid differ in important respects from countries that are not eligible for such aid (see Table I ). The results confirm that UNCHR resolutions have no effect on bilateral aid receipts. The coefficient on multilateral aid remains substantively (.23) and statistically (p=.01) significant in the random effects model, but is no longer significant in the fixed-effect specification on this smaller sample of countries (p=.15 in a two-tailed test).
Third, we ran several leaner model specifications to disclose effects that are hidden when including large numbers of variables (Achen, 2005) . Our conclusions stood in a model that incorporated only the UN resolution, a lagged dependent variable, orthogonal time trends, and fixed-effects control for unit heterogeneity. Given concerns about omitted variable bias, we also estimated models with additional control variables. These included a 22 dummy variable that assumes the value 1 when a state gained independence after 1950 (as countries that were recent colonies are generally expected to obtain higher levels of aid, e.g.
Neumayer, 2003c), a variable that takes the value 1 for states that are engaged in a major strategic rivalry (Thompson, 2001) , and 0 otherwise (as states in these rivalries may attract aid from donors partial to a side in the dispute), and annual changes in GDP and population as well as squared terms of those variables. The main results are robust to these permutations. 26 Fourth, we considered the impact on aid allocations of other (weaker) instruments at the UNCHR's disposal, for instance, the commission's use of confidential sessions and advisory opinions (see . We thus employed a dichotomous indicator that combines all UNCHR mechanisms, in place of our UNCHR public resolutions variable, and re-estimated the models in Table II . The new indicator did not reach conventional levels of significance in any specification.
Fifth, we re-estimated all models using the natural log of levels (rather than per capita levels) as the dependent variable. These models included lagged levels of aid, GDP, population and population squared, as well as either random or fixed country-effects. In all models, public UNCHR resolutions had no effect on bilateral aid levels and substantively yet statistically significant effects on multilateral levels of aid as well as World Bank aid.
Sixth, we obtained estimates from Heckman treatment models of the effects on aid when a country is targeted by a public resolution. 27 With non-random assignment into the treatment and control groups -resolution-receiving and non-resolution receiving countries, respectively --the treatment is conceivably correlated with the model's residual term. 28 If so, the estimated coefficient on the treatment variable also captures the effect of omitted or mis-measured variables. A corrective is offered by the Heckman treatment model, which is a member of the class of 'control function' estimators, which seek to correct for nonrandom assignment. 29 While treatment regressions are rarely used in political science (for an exception, see Lebovic, 2005) , the method is based on the same principle as the Heckman selection model (Heckman, 1979) , which is widely employed in studies of arms transfers and aid distributions. The treatment model assumes that certain countries are selected (a binary dependent variable) for exceptional treatment (the first stage) -here, in the form of a public resolution cast against that state in the UNCHR -which leads to penalties at the second stage (a continuous dependent variable) -here, in the form of an average downward change in the country's foreign aid receipts (per capita). If we assume that the error terms in both equations are jointly normally distributed, we can obtain an estimate of the conditional mean of the unobservable variable from the treatment regression and insert this estimate in the outcome (aid level changes) equation.
We estimated a Heckman treatment model by specifying a treatment equationexplaining why countries are targeted by UNCHR resolutions -based on ). Since we cannot reject the null-hypothesis that the selection and the outcome equation are independent, we do not report the full results here. 30 We note,
however, that the coefficient on the UNCHR resolution is significant for World Bank aid and falls just short of the .05 significance level for overall multilateral aid (z=1.91, which implies significance in a one-tailed test).
Finally, to alleviate any remaining concerns that the results are peculiar to our specific data or model specifications, we replicated a published study on the determinants of multilateral lending (Neumayer, 2003b) and added the UNCHR public resolution variable to models employed in that study. All variables in Neumayer's model are three-year averages for 160 countries between 1983 and 1997. The dependent variable is the share of overall multilateral aid that a country receives. Apart from the independent variables introduced earlier in this article, the analysis includes the number of years (since 1900) a country was a colony of an OECD country, the minimum distance between a country's capital and New
York, Rotterdam, and Tokyo, a country's physical quality of life index (PQLI) score, and a country's level of corruption based on a World Bank and Asian Development Bank indicator (Neumayer, 2003b) . The model is estimated using linear regression with robust standard errors clustered on recipient countries. Table III shows that a UNCHR resolution has a strong and statistically significant effect in almost all model specifications. A UNCHR resolution is estimated, in most model specifications, to coincide with a drop in a country's multilateral aid share of around .40%, a sizeable reduction given that the mean share of aid in the sample is .70 (SD=1.23).
Although the UNCHR resolution is insignificant at the .05 level (in a two-tailed test) in the model that includes all variables, the coefficient is significant to the .05 level in a one-tailed test (appropriate as we have a directional hypothesis). Important to note is that, after controlling for a UNCHR resolution, levels of political freedom are no longer a statistically significant correlate of multilateral aid receipts. This supports our general theoretical proposition that human rights violations affect aid distributions conditionally through the mediating influence of multilateral institutions.
Conclusions
The statistical analysis provides strong evidence that UNCHR resolutions that condemn a country for poor human rights performance are correlated with large reductions in World
Bank and multilateral loan commitments, but have no impact on bilateral aid allocations. Third, these insights contribute to the literature that asks why governments choose to delegate aid allocation to multilateral institutions. Milner (2006) argues that governments do so because their domestic publics will doubt otherwise that aid has a non-political character. Rodrik (1996) argues that, compared to individual donors, multilateral aid institutions can more credibly demand policy concessions from aid recipients. We provide an additional reason: multilateralism allows states to overcome a collaboration dilemmabased in the competitiveness of strategic-based aid allocations --that prevents states from deferring to normative principles when allocating aid.
Our findings are interesting also because the World Bank is not generally believed to engage in human rights norms enforcement. Although the World Bank is under considerable pressure from NGOs and governments to take human rights and other social/political factors into consideration when making policy, project, and programmatic decisions, and has adjusted its staff and priorities accordingly, it must also defer to the preferences of its principals. UN resolutions denouncing the human rights performance of an individual government provide a strong signal that project applications by that government can and should be evaluated with admonition. These signals are likely less important for the commission actions per se than what they represent -a glimpse or culmination of a larger political process through which countries are marginalized in international politics. By the time the UNCHR acts decisively against alleged violators, they could be well along in the process of global shaming. Notable, for instance, is that the commission contended with some cases, e.g., Israel, because they were symbolic cases and acted, then, in response to world opinion as much as to reinforce that opinion. Regardless, the implication remains that, in an important sense, multilateral institutions bolstered their interventions by ensuring that they had adequate international political support, and thus that the World Bank acted as a selective enforcer of international human rights norms. 
